The possibility of increasing the age at which Social Security benefits are first paid merits renewed scrutiny for at least three reasons:
The name is doubly misleading: the 'normal' age for claiming benefits is not 66, as well over half of benefit claims come before age 66; and claiming benefits often occurs before and sometimes well after actual retirement. In fact,'raising the full-benefits age' is no different-except in labeling-from a proportional across-the-board benefit cut. In particular, it leaves unchanged the age at which benefits may first be claimed. That age, now 62, is set to stay there under current law. 3 Few propose raising the age when benefits can first be claimed. 4 The reason is that raising the 'unreduced benefits age' lowers program costs, while increasing the age of initial eligibility does not. The impact on benefits of raising the age at which 'unreduced' benefits are paid is shown in table 1. 5 The effect on long-term outlays is negligible because the delay in the payment of benefits until a later age triggers an increase in the amount of benefits paid in each period, calculated so that the expected present value of lifetime benefits is approximately unchanged. 6 Given the sizeable bonus for later claiming, it might seem that many people would wait to take benefits. Yet, few do (see table 2 ). 7 One justification advanced for raising the age at which unreduced benefits are paid-that is, cutting benefits across the board-rests on increases in life-expectancy. Cuts in benefit amounts can be viewed as an offset to the greater duration of payments. However, increases in longevity have been concentrated among high earners. 8 In contrast, across-the-board benefit cuts affect high and low earners alike. In fact, life expectancy among low earners has risen little in the last forty years. 9 But cutting benefits while continuing to permit workers to claim benefits at age 62 creates the possibility that early claimants who fail to anticipate the exhaustion or erosion of other income sources may find when older that they have meager incomes. The capacity of the 'young-old' to supplement pensions with earnings from part time work usually diminishes with age. Inflation erodes the value of most private pensions, as few are inflation adjusted. And private assets may be depleted, including defined-benefit pensions, which increasingly carry a lump-sum payment option. For all these reasons, dependence on Social Security can be expected to increase with age; in fact it does (see table 3 ). Each of these factors helps explain why the proportion of people with incomes below or near poverty increases with age, as shown in table 4.
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They also contribute to the fact that Social Security is the sole source of income for 22 percent of those over age 65 and provides more than half of their income for 64 percent.
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To avoid leaving the very old with meager Social Security benefits, some analysts have proposed that any increase in the 'unreduced benefits' age should be matched to an increase in the 'initial entitlements' age.
Those holding this position must answer a threshold question: why should workers not be allowed to take their social Security benefits whenever they want? One reason rests on the same foundation as that for Social Security itself. The case for Social Security rests on three propositions:
• that enough people are short-sighted or procrastinate when it comes to retirement saving, saving too little or starting to save too late to provide adequate income during retirement, to justify collective intervention to mandate saving;
• that more income redistribution to the elderly, disabled, and survivors than to others is acceptable because work disincentive effects from income related transfers is of less concern when directed to these groups than to others in the population; and
• that not all financial and insurance markets exist and operate efficiently.
The case for setting an age before which benefits cannot be claimed is similar: that a sizeable fraction of people would elect to take actuarially reduced benefits at a very early age, thereby failing to achieve optimal lifetime income smoothing and frustrating achievement of the goal of providing adequate retirement income. These considerations lead to setting an age before which Social Security cannot be claimed. For similar reasons, Congress penalizes withdrawal of funds from tax-sheltered savings accounts before age 59-½. Thus, setting an age before which benefits cannot be claimed increases the chance that retirees, some of whom are myopic, will have socially adequate incomes.
Delaying the age at which benefits are first paid also imposes social costs. It denies financial support to those workers for whom continuing work imposes significant physical or mental hardship. Choosing the 'right' age of initial eligibility involves the policy equivalent of type 1 and type 2 errors in statistics-balancing the conflicting social goals: assuring the elderly 'adequate' income versus allowing people to claim benefits at an early age that will boost their welfare. In a tautological sense, those who retire differ from those who do not-they are more likely to prefer to retire. Whether these two groups differ from one another in terms of income, wealth, health, and pension status is an empirical matter.
In this paper, we compare certain characteristics of people in their early 60s who stop working with those who continue working. Over the early retirement ages, the differences appear to be small and to have changed little in recent years. We then estimate a simple equation that generates the degree to which various personal characteristics contribute to the decision to retire. Next, we use as weights the coefficients from this equation to compute a retirement propensity index for each person in a large longitudinal survey and show the distribution of retirement propensities of both those who do and those who do not retire. The overlap of these distributions is substantial. The objective characteristics of those who retire and of those who remain active are quite similar.
We then consider certain policies that might be adopted to provide assistance to those who might suffer significant hardship if the age of initial eligibility for Social Security benefits were increased.
CHARACTERISTICS OF WORKERS RETIRING AT VARIOUS AGES
We focus on people between the ages of 55 and 66, the years during which most people end their working careers. Our objective is to detect differences between the personal characteristics of those who stop working and those who continue. How do they differ at a point in time? How have they changed over time? We rely on data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), a longitudinal survey consisting of five cohorts, the first of which was initially surveyed in 1992. Cohort members are surveyed roughly every two years. The latest of ten survey waves was done in 2006. Members of two of the cohorts were first interviewed when their members were at least 68 years old, beyond the ages on which we are focusing; accordingly, we omit these observations.
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The included groups are:
• The HRS cohort. Its members were born from 1931 through 1941 and were first interviewed in 1992. Those members of the HRS cohort born before 1936 were over age 56 when first interviewed and are excluded. We divided the other HRS households into three groups based on birth years: 1936-37, 1938-39, and 1940-41.
• The War Babies cohort. Its members were born from 1942 through 1947. They were first interviewed in 1998. The War Babies cohort is about the same size as each of the HRS sub-groups. We treat it as a single group.
• Early Baby Boomers. Its members were born from 1948 through 1953. They were first interviewed in 2004. None of its members was older than 58 as of 2006, the date of the last survey.
Appendix tables A1 through A7 present information on the education, health, income, earnings, assets, job characteristics, and pension status of members of successive cohorts who were initially working, some of whom remained at work and some of whom did not. The tables report the personal characteristics of people working, respectively at ages 55, 58, 61, 62, and 63, who stopped working before the next survey, when they were, respectively 56-58, 59-61, 62-63, 63-65, and 64-66. Those in the first two groups who stopped working are not eligible under current law for Social Security retirement benefits. Those in the latter three groups are eligible under current law, but might not be if the age of initial eligibility were increased. Table 5 shows the number of observations in each of the five age groups in each of five birth cohorts. Because sample sizes are modest all of the results are subject to considerable sampling error. The following general picture emerges:
• Educational attainments of both retirees and those remaining active have increased over time. Those who retire are, in general, less well educated than are those who remain economically active.
• Those who retire are more likely than those who remain active to be in poor or fair health, but the large majority of both those who retire and those who remain active report that their health is the same as it was or better than previously. The proportion of both those who retire and of those who remain active who report limitations on activities of daily living is small, but most of both groups report some functional limitations. Once again, those who retire report somewhat more difficulties in both categories than do those who remain active.
• There is little systematic difference in the reported likelihood of living to age 75 between those who retire and those who remain active. Oddly, the probability does not increase as respondents age.
• There is little consistent difference in asset holdings between those who retire and those who remain active.
• Most conditions of employment for those who retire are similar to those of people who remain economically active. There is one important and unsurprising exceptionthose who worked thirty or more hours per week when initially surveyed were more likely to be economically active at the next survey than are those who are working fewer than 30 hours.
• Earnings and total family income differ widely both among those who leave the labor force before the age of eligibility for Social Security and those who remain economically active until after they are eligible for benefits.
• The patterns of pension holdings do not differ consistently between those who retire and those who remain economically active.
These two-way correlations between each of these worker attributes and the decision whether or not to remain economically active are less informative than are estimates of the simultaneous impact of all of these factors on the retirement decision. We therefore estimate two equations (OLS and logit) relating the decision to retire to personal characteristics. The dependent variable takes on a value of one if the respondent in a prior survey year reported that he/she was working for pay and is now not working for pay, and a value of zero if the respondent is still working for pay. The independent variables are personal characteristics: age, sex, race, education, self-rated health status, change in self-rated health, limitations in activities of daily living, functional limitations, total household assets, pension status, self-reported job characteristics, and earnings. In addition, we include dummy variables for survey cohorts to identify trend changes in retirement propensities. The variable definitions are shown in table 6.
The equations do not show structural relationships between the decision to stop working and the personal characteristics. Rather, they provide weights for the estimation of a 'retirement propensity score' which can be used to determine how different those who continue working are from those who stop working. We estimated equations that included either all decisions to stop working for pay or the first such decision within the age ranges on which we are focusing. We ran the regressions with and without weights on the observations. With few exceptions, the results are of the same sign and similar in size and significance level regardless of the definition of stopping work, weights, and regression method. Table 7 shows OLS coefficients and logit odds ratios for the run on all cessations of working for pay run on unweighted observations. These runs omit other variables that turned out to be insignificant including a variable for whether the respondent is or is not Hispanic and a series of fifteen dummy variables for the respondents' occupations (professional, sales, clerical, and so on) none of which was close to significant.
• Quite unsurprisingly, as workers age, they tend to stop working. However, conditional on initially working for pay at a given age, the disposition to withdraw from the labor force does not increase consistently with age. This pattern differs from the timing of claiming Social Security retirement benefits, which shows a large spike at age 62, the first age of eligibility, and a smaller spike at ages 65 and 66, the age at which "unreduced" benefits have been paid.
• Women are more disposed to stop working than men, other things held constant.
• Other variables held constant, the likelihood of stopping working for pay has been falling over time, a fact that is readily apparent in labor-force participation data.
• After controlling for other factors, the decision to stop working for pay does not differ meaningfully between whites and other racial groups.
• More educated workers are less likely than less educated workers to leave the work force.
• The level and change of health status are powerfully related to the cessation of work.
Compared to people in excellent health, working for pay is progressively lower if health is only good, fair, or poor. Even a small decline in health status is associated with an increased likelihood of stopping work, and a large decline greatly increases the likelihood. It is possible that survey respondents believe that poor health or claiming a decline in health status is a respectable reason for stopping work. If so, the statistical estimates may overstate the real contribution of health to the decision to retire.
• Limitation in performing activities of daily living and functional limitations both increase the likelihood of stopping work, independently of general health status or change in health status.
• Standard economic theory predicts that the propensity to stop working will increase with wealth. The regression results are generally consistent with that prediction, although the gradient is rather shallow.
• Having a pension has no significant impact on the decision to stop working, but having a defined benefit pension has a strong effect.
• Perhaps the most surprising result is the weakness of the independent effect of job characteristics on the tendency to stop working. Physical effort, stooping and bending, and lifting heavy weight have no statistically significant effect on the decision to stop working and some of the signs are opposite to what one might expect. This result is strikingly at odds with the conventional impression that those engaged in physically burdensome work are differentially forced to retire at early ages. Stress is the only job characteristic associated with retirement.
RETIREMENT PROPENSITY AND VULNERABILITY SCORES
The retirement propensity, z ijt , of each person, i, or age, j, working at a given time, t, is the value from equation (1 Based on this equation, we computed retirement propensity scores for every person working at ages 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, and 68 or older. We arrayed the scores of all persons who were working and all persons who had stopped working since the last survey within each age group. Propensity scores are higher on the average for those who stopped working than for those who continued working. That is, they tended to be non-white, have lower education, have poorer health, be more likely to have deteriorating health, to have one or more limits on activities of daily living or functional limitations, to have greater assets, to have a defined benefit pension, and low earnings. The distributions of workers and those who had stopped working overlapped to a considerable extent.
Typically, about one third of those who stopped working had a lower retirement propensity score than did the median person who continued to work. About one third of those who continued to work had a higher retirement propensity score than the median of those who stopped working.
The propensity scores include variables that both make continued work difficult or unremunerative, such as poor health, low education, and low income, and variables that make retirement an attractive option, such as high wealth. Accordingly, we also compute a retirement vulnerability score, based on all of the variables used in estimating equation (1) The retirement vulnerability scores overlap even more than do the retirement propensity scores.
Large proportions of those who stop work have lower vulnerability scores than do those who continue working, and many of those who continue working have higher retirement vulnerability scores than do those who stop working.
We next ranked those who retired and those who continued to work by retirement vulnerability scores, within age groups: 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, and 68 or older. We then separated those within each age group who retired and those who continue to work for pay by retirement vulnerability score deciles. The results are shown in table 8. The proportion of members of each decile who retire rises with retirement vulnerability score, but a majority of the members of even the most vulnerable deciles continue to work, and roughly one-fifth of those in even the least vulnerable deciles stop working for pay.
ALTERNATIVES TO EARLY SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
Retirees and workers of a given age have different objectively measurable personal characteristics, those characteristics overlap to a remarkable degree. That their subjective preferences differ is close to tautological. To be sure, something approaching necessity drives some retirement decisions. In other cases, however, the decision to stop working is clearly a matter of preference and choice. Should Social Security benefits be reduced across-the-board by increasing the full-benefits age, the issue of whether to raise the age of initial eligibility needs to be faced, in order to avoid early claims that leave workers with inadequate pensions. If the initial eligibility age were increased, it would be important to provide support for those who stop working because of something approaching exigent circumstances.
Because of the large weight of poor or deteriorating health in the retirement vulnerability score, attention should be given to changes in rules governing access to disability insurance for workers at age 62. People are ruled ineligible for Disability Insurance benefits if they have not worked in jobs covered by Social Security for five of the last ten years, even if they satisfy all other requirements. Most of those who fail this test will nonetheless have worked ten years since age 21, the requirement for retirement benefits. People may fail this continuity of work requirement if they have been ill or unemployed for a sizeable portion of the decade before they reach age 62. They may also fail the continuity of work test if they have been employed by one of the four states whose employees are not covered by Social Security. One study reports that approximately 12 percent of early retirees would be eligible for Disability Insurance but for the 'continuity of work' requirement. 13 It would be straightforward to relax this requirement for workers once they reach age 62. Doing so would permit people with spotty work records who become disabled to receive disability insurance benefits, which are equal to the retirement benefits they would have received had they claimed benefits at age 66, the full benefits age.
These benefits are 25 percent higher than the early retirement benefits they receive at age 62. is from earnings (less if income is from other sources). Applicants must have 'countable' assets of less than $2,000 for individuals or $3,000 for couples. Assets include most things that can be readily converted into cash-defined-contribution pensions count, but defined-benefit pensions do not.
Several changes in SSI could cushion the effect of raising the initial age of eligibility for Social Security retirement benefits. The age of eligibility for SSI benefits for the elderly could be lowered from age 65 to age 62. The definition of disability under the SSI program could be relaxed at age 62, even to the point of making low income the sole criterion for benefits, as is now the case for Medicaid enrollment under the Affordable Care Act. The asset test for SSI disability benefits could be relaxed at age 62.
In general, the case for relaxing the asset test for all SSI applicants is strong. Since the SSI law was enacted in 1972, the asset limit has been increased in nominal terms by 33 percent, while mean nominal per capita income has increased nearly 400 percent. Furthermore, a common asset that was not included in countable assets, defined-benefit pensions, has been mostly replaced by defined-contribution pensions, which are counted, making the asset test more stringent than in the past, even if the value of household assets is otherwise the same.
CONCLUSION
All assistance programs are prone to two errors: providing help when it is not intended and failing to provide help when it is intended. For the reasons stated earlier in this paper, setting any minimum age of initial eligibility for Social Security will inevitably generate both errors. Whether the decisions to provide reduced retirement benefits at age 62 properly balanced the likelihood of each type of loss when this age was set-in 1956 for women and in 1961 for men-depended on both objective considerations, such as life expectancy and the health of people at the early entitlement age, and on the values of decision makers and the public at the time.
Since then, objective considerations have changed. Life expectancy has increased, most for those with comparatively high earnings. Defined-benefit pensions have been supplanted by defined-contribution pensions. Labor force participation rates of older workers first fell and more recently have begun to increase. The tabulations in this paper suggest that while those at each age who retire and those who remain active differ in some degree in objectively measurable personal characteristics, those characteristics overlap to a great extent. Given these developments, it seems sensible to reexamine the age of initial eligibility for Social Security retirement benefits, especially if ways can be designed to protect those early retirees for whom continued work poses a particular hardship. 
